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NOTES AND COMMENTS
would not allow the survivor to take the balance as in Hill v. Havens,
supra, whether the contract be for joint ownership with right of sur-
vivorship or whether it be for payment to either or to the survivor. 50
There is a need today for a definite rule by which a person may
deposit money in a bank with the assurance that he can make use of
the money during his life and that upon his death his wife or some
,designated person may have funds to live on without waiting for the
administration of his estate. A recognition of the contract theory
could assure this. If this theory is not followed, then legislation should
be passed to make a conclusive right in the survivor.
CHARLES E. NICHOLS.
Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech-Motion Pictures
"Expression by means of motion pictures is included within the
free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments."' Thus the Supreme Court of the United States, in a recent
unanimous decision, overturned the thirty-seven year old precedent of
Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio,2 and paved
the way for a substantial judicial rewriting of the law relating to the
official censorship of motion pictures, a practice currently authorized
by statute in eight states,3 and by ordinance in perhaps 75 cities.4
The motion picture, from its early years a cause of concern to
municipal officials fearful of its potential for evil,5 was first subjected to
" Most North Carolina banks use only the words "payable to either or to the
survivor." The Home Building and Loan Association, in addition to this, uses
the joint tenancy feature. If the contract theory were followed, the survivor's
rights would be the same in either case; but if a dispute developed between A and
B over the account, B's chances would seem to be much better if joint tenancy
or joint ownership words were used. See notes 30 and 34, supra. For suggestions
in drafting joint account signature cards see: 1 PATON'S DIGEST; LEGAL OPINIONS
AND BANKING LAW §§ 1810, 1811 (1926).
1 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 72 Sup. Ct. 777, 781 (1952).
-236 U. S. 230 (1915), affirning 215 Fed. 138 (N. D. Ohio 1914).
'Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia. For current statute citations, see note 14, infra.
'Kupferman and O'Brien, Motion Picture Censorship-The Memphis Blues,
36 CORNELL L. Q. 273, 276 n. 24 (1951) ; Note, 39 COL. L. Rav. 1383, 1385 n. 17
(1939). For a comprehensive view of the development and operation of legal
film censorship see INGLIS, FREEDOM OF THE MOVIES (1947); CHAFEE, FREE
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 540-548 (1941) ; ERNST AND LORENTz, CENSORED:
THE PRIVATE LIFE OF THE MOVIES (1930) ; Note, 64 A. L. R. 505 (1930) ; Notes,
39 COL. L. REV. 1383 (1939), 60 YALE L. J. 696 (1951) ; Comment, 49 YALE L. J. 87(1939).
'Motion pictures were invented by Edison in 1889, and first publicly exhibited
in 1894. INGLIS, FREEDOM OF THE MOVIES 75 (1947). In 1909 New York banned
children under 16 from commercial movie theaters unless accompanied by a
parent or guardian. 1 N. Y. Laws 1909, c. 278. That provision remains a part
of the New York law. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 484 (1).
The circumstances under which films are normally shown-the darkened
theater, the freedom from outside distraction, the brightly lighted screen-all
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official censorship by a Chicago ordinance of 1907.0 This ordinance
required all films to be viewed and approved by the chief of police
before exhibition in the city, and empowered that officer to ban any
film which he found to be immoral or obscene. Pennsylvania enacted
the first state censorship statute in 1911, requiring that all films to be
shown in the state be submitted to the state board of censors, which was
directed to approve such films as it found to be "moral and proper, and
[to] disapprove ... films ... which are sacrilegious, obscene, indecent,
or immoral, or such as tend to corrupt morals."'7  Statutes patterned
after the Pennsylvania act were passed in Kansas" and Ohio0 in 1913.
The constitutionality of movie censorship legislation then in effect
was established in 1915, in consequence of a coordinated series of legal
actions, the most important of which was Mutual Film Corporation v.
Industrial Commission of Ohio.'° Facing for the first time the issue
of whether a state had the power to censor films, the United States
Supreme Court held the Ohio law to be a valid exercise of the police
power of the state. The court justified its holding that the statute
worked no abridgement of freedom of speech and press, condemnable
under the Ohio Constitution," by declaring that the movies did not
add immeasurably to the persuasiveness and allure of the movies, particularly
among children. Add to this the low quality of fare offered by the early movie
houses, and the apprehensions of parents and officials are more readily under-
standable.
'This ordinance was upheld as a valid regulation, under the charter of the
city, in Block v. Chicago, 239 Ill. 251, 87 N. E. 1011 (1909).
" Pa. Laws 1911, p. 1067, § 6. This statute was repealed in 1915, and replaced
by a statute (Pa. Laws 1915, p. 534) which has remained basically unchanged to
the present. For current citation, see note 14, infra.
8 Kansas Laws 1913, c. 294. This law was repealed in 1917, and replaced
by a law that was essentially the same as the present statute. See note 14, inf ra.
' 103 Ohio Laws 1913, H. B. No. 322, p. 399. Amended in 1915, the 1913
statute was superseded by the version now in force in 1943. 120 Ohio Laws 1943,
p. 475 at 481. See note 14, infra.
10236 U. S. 230 (1915), affirming 215 Fed. 138 (N. D. Ohio 1914). There
petitioner appealed from the refusal of the federal district court to enjoin the
enforcement of the 1913 Ohio statute, which made approval by the state censor
board a prerequisite to lawful public exhibition of any movie film, and provided
that "only such films as are in the judgment and discretion of the board of censors
of a moral, educational or amusing and harmless character" should be licensed.
103 Ohio Laws 1913, H. B. No. 322, § 4.
The other cases of this related group were Mutual Film Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, of Ohio, 215 Fed. 138 (N. D. Ohio 1914), aff'd, 236 U. S. 247 (1915) ;
Mutual Film Corp. of Missouri v. Hodges, 236 U. S. 248 (1915) (validity of the
Kansas statute upheld); Mutual Film Corp. v. Chicago, 224 Fed. 101 (7th Cir.
1915) (Chicago ordinance held not violative of the United States Constitution,
Amendments 1 and 14); Buffalo Branch, Mutual Film Corp. v. Breitinger, 250
Pa. 225, 95 AtI. 433 (1915) (Pennsylvania statute held valid). All of these
actions were brought by film distributors, who purchase film prints from pro-
ducers for rental to. exhibitors. Since exhibitors in jurisdictions where censor-
ship is practiced refuse to rent films not approved for showing by the censor
board to which they are subject, the burden of censorship falls most heavily on
the distributor.
" Petitioner maintained in its bill and oral argument before the district court
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merit judicial recognition as a medium of expression worthy of con-
stitutional protection; that a state might reasonably find in the harmful
potentialities of the movies justification for their restriction; and that
"the exhibition of moving pictures is a business pure and simple, orig-
inated and conducted for profit, like other spectacles, [and] not to be
regarded ... as part of the press of the country or as organs of public
opinion. '12
Within the protective constitutional bastions raised about it by these
-decisions, the practice of motion picture censorship developed in vir-
tually complete freedom from successful assault. With the Pennsyl-
vania act of 191513 as the basic model, six other states14 established
film censorship as a part'of their law, though only three of these later
that the statute violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution. See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 215
Fed. 138 (N. D. Ohio 1914). However, it apparently abandoned that argument
on appeal to the United States Supreme Court, and relied instead on the freedom
of speech and press guarantees of the Ohio Constitution, art. I, sec. 11, which
reads: "no law shall be-passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or
of the press."
" Mutual Film Corp. v: Industrial Commn. of Ohio; 236 U. S. 230, 244
(1915). The court further held that the Ohio law was neither an improper dele-
gation of legislative power, nor an unlawful burden on interstate commerce. On
the authority of this holding were decided the - ther test actions cited in note 10,
supra.
" Pa. Laws 1915, No. 239.
" Maryland (1916), MD. ANN. CoDE GEN. LAWS art. 66A, § 1 through- § 26
(1939), as amended, art. 66A, § 1, § 9 through'§ 12 (Cum. Supp. 1947) ; New
York (1921), N. Y. EDUC. LAW § 120 through § 132; Florida (1921), FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 521.01 through § 521.04 (1943) (the Florida -statute, which establishes no
censor board, but prohibits the showing .of any film not approved by the National
Board of Review or the New York state censor board, was declared unconsti-
tutional in State v. Coleman, Cir. Ct. of Fla., llth Judicial Cir., May 1, 1937,
49 YALE L. J. 87, 93 n. 41 (1939) ; however, this decision appears not to have
been appealed, and the statute is included in the latest codification of the Florida
statutes); Virginia (1922), VA. CoDE ANN. § 2-98 through § 2-116 (1950);
Connecticut (1925), Conn. Pub. Acts 1925, c. 177, repealed, Conn. Pub. Acts 1927,
c. 318, § 9 (the Connecticut act took the form of a revenue measure levying a tax
on all films licensed and making the fax commissioner the state censor) ; Louisiana
(1935), LA. STAT. ANN. § 4:301 through § 4:307 (West, 1951) (enacted to give
to the Huey Long organization effective control of film showings in Louisiana,
the statute appears not to have been enforced, due perhaps to Long's death shortly
after its passage).
The earlier statutes were amended following the Mutual Film cases. See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 4 § 41 through § 58 (Purdon, 1930), as amended, tit. 4, § 59
through § 66 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1951); and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71 § 119 (Pur-
don Cum. Supp. 1951); OHio GEN. ConE ANN. § 154-47 through § 154-47i
(Page, 1946), as amended, OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. § 154-47 (Page Cum. Supp.
1951); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-101 through § 51-112, and § 74-2201 through
§ 74-2209 (1949).
Massachusetts defeated a censorship law in a referendum vote in 1922, but
the same result is achieved through a Lord's Day observance statute (restricting
certain types of activities on Sunday); which vests censorship powers in the
bureau of state police. MAss. ANN. LAws C. 136, § 1 through § 4 (1950). Since
it would be impractical to circulate uncensored films for weekday use only, vir-
tually all films are submitted for censorship. Comment, 49 YALE L. J. 87, 91 n.
31 (1939).
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statutes have been seriously enforced. 15  In addition, a substantial
number of municipalities have provided by ordinance for censorship of
movies.10 Newsreels were held to be subject to censorship, where no
special exemption was extended to them by statute.17 Although no
provision was made for motion picture sound tracks by existing statutes,
they were held to be subject to censorship shortly after their intro-
duction in 1926.18
The New York motion picture censorship statute10 may be con-
sidered typical of those statutes now enforced. The power of film
censorship is exercised by the Motion Picture Division of the State
Department of Education. 20 It is a misdemeanor 21 commercially to
exhibit, or to sell, lease, or lend for commercial showing any motion
picture (with stated exceptions) 22 unless previously licensed by the
North Carolina appears never to have enacted a motion picture censorship
statute. Legislation of this type has been under consideration by virtually every
state legislature. Harrison, Televisioa and Censorship, 21 PA. B. A. Q. 128,
134 (1950).
There has been little federal legislation on the subject, despite frequent pro-
posals of national censorship since 1915. INGLIS, FRaEroM OF THE MoviEs 68-70
(1947) ; Note, 60 YALE L. J. 696, n. 1 (1951) ; Comment, 49 YALE L. J. 87, 102(1939). Currently a federal statute prohibits the importation of any "obscene,
lewd, lascivious, or filthy .. . motion picture film." 62 STAT. 768 (1948), 18
U. S. C. § 1462 (Supp. II, 1949). It is also unlawful to import "prints" or
"pictures" promoting treason or insurrection against the United States, or "other
articles of indecent or immoral use or tendency." 62 STAT. 718 (1948), 18 U. S. C.
§ 552 (Supp. II, 1949).
" The New York, Maryland, and Virginia acts are enforced. The Connecti-
cut law was repealed two years after enactment. The Florida and Louisiana
statutes appear never to have been enforced. See note 14, supra.
"o Among the cities which have some form of film censorship at present are
Chicago, Ray. CHICAGO Con § 1952 through § 1961 (1931); Memphis, 1 MEm-
PHIs DIGEST § 1131 through § 1139 (1931) ; Detroit, DEROIT CoMP. ORDs. c. 63,§ 20 through § 22 (1945); Milwaukee, MLwAUKEE CODE OF Oas. § 83.2 et seq.
(1941) ; Atlanta, ATLANTA CODE § 5-305 § 58-107,8, § 66-504 (1942). See Note,
60 YALE L. J. 696, 697 notes 3, 4 (1951), for a discussion of the variant forms
which municipal censorship takes.1 Pathe Exchange, Inc. v. Cobb, 202 App. Div. 450, 195 N. Y. Supp, 661 (3d
Dep't 1922), aff'd, 236 N. Y. 539, 142 N. E. 274 (1923). New York and three
other states presently exempt "current events" films from censorship. N. Y.
EDUC. LAW § 123; VA. CODE ANN. § 2-106 (1950); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 43(Purdon, 1930); KAr. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-103 (1949). An Ohio municipal
court recently held newsreels to be exempt from censorship under the Ohio
statute. [Raleigh] News and Observer, Sept. 22, 1952, p. 4, col. 3.
" In re Vitagraph, Inc., 295 Pa. 471, 145 Atl. 518 (1929); In re Fox Film
Corp., 295 Pa. 461, 145 Atl. 514 (1929).
"N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 120 through § 132. The present statute was enacted
in 1927 (1 N. Y. Laws 1927, c. 153, § 28), and supersedes the original act of
1921 (3 N. Y. Laws 1921, c. 715).
2 N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 120. The Director and other officers of the Division
are appointed by the Board of Regents. N. Y. Enuc. LAW § 120.N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 131.
22 Scientific films intended for use only by learned professions, and films in-
tended solely for educational, charitable, or religious purposes, or for exhibition
by an employer to his employees for their education and welfare, may be licensed
without examination, upon the filing of the prescribed application, including a
sworn description of the film. "Current events" films are entirely exempt from
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Department.23 Upon proper submission,24 each film must be promptly
examined, "and unless such film or a part thereof is obscene, indecent,
immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its ex-
hibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime, [the censor]
shall issue a license therefor.1
'25
Where a license is denied, 26 both administrative and judicial re-
view of such determination is provided.2 7 However, reversals by the
Board of Regents (the directing body of the State Department of Edu-
cation, and hence of the Motion Picture Division) are rare, and ap-
parently the New York courts have never upset a license denial by
the Department of Education. 28  This results largely from the rule
that on appeal from the censor, the only question open to the court-
is whether that officer has abused his discretion.29  So vague are the
censorship. N. Y. EDuc. LA w § 123. But it is within the power of the Motion
Picture Division to decide whether a given film shall be classified as "current
events" or not. Rollins v. Graves, 177 Misc. 39, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 510 (Sup. Ct.
1941), aft'd, 263 App. Div. 907, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 11 (1942).
" N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 129.
2" Application for a film exhibition permit must be made in a prescribed,
written form accompanied by a print of the picture to be licensed. N. Y. EDuc.
LAW § 127.
'" N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 122. For the Director's views on the purpose and ef-
fectiveness of the operations of the Division, see Alpert, Talk With a Movie
Censor, Saturday Review of Literature, Nov. 22, 1952, p. 21.
11 N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 124. If a license is denied, the censor must "furnish to
the applicant therefor a written report of the reasons for his refusal and a de-
scription of each rejected part of a film not rejected in toto." N. Y. EDUC. LAw
§ 122.
Exhibition permits may be revoked by the censor five days after notice in
writing is mailed to the licensee. Thereafter such film may be resubmitted for
licensing de novo. N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 125. Fraud in the license application
or affidavit, or any unauthorized alteration of the film after licensing, or con-
viction for any *crime committed by the exhibition or unlawful possession of any
film in the state per se works the revocation of any permit outstanding for such
film. N. Y. EDUC. LAw § 128. All advertising matter used in connection with
any movie must conform to the same standards as the film itself, and the use
of matter forbidden by the statute is sufficient cause for revocation of a permit.
N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 130.
" From the censor's denial of license, appeal lies to the Director of the
Division; from the Director's affirmation of the censor, to the Board of Regents,
or a designated committee thereof; and from an affirmance by the Board of
Regents, to the state courts. N. Y. EDUc. LAW § 124.
" Note, 39 CoL. L. REv. 1383, 1397 (1939). The Commissioner of Educa-
tion refused to license the movie Birth of a Baby, finding it "indecent" and "im-
moral." The Board of Regents modified the Commissioner's determination, and
allowed exhibition for educational purposes only. It was sustained by the Ap-
pellate Division. American Committee on Maternal Welfare, Inc. v. Mangan,
257 App. Div. 570, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 39 (3d Dep't 1939). A New Jersey court
has held differently in a similar situation, ruling that where the presentation of
a certain film "would not be objectionable if conducted under non-commercial
auspices, it is not within the power of the defendants [censors] to revoke a
theatre license if the same film is shown under commercial auspices." Hygenic
Productions, Inc. v. Keenan, 1 N. J. Super. 461, 62 A. 2d 150, 152 (Ch. 1948).
" Midwest Photo-Play Corp. v. Miller, 102 Kan. 356, 169 Pac. 1154 (1918);
Rollins v. Graves, 177 Misc. 39, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 510 (Sup. Ct 1941),
aff'd, 263 App. Div. 907, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 11 (1942); Foy Productions Ltd. v.
1952]
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-standards to be applied that there will rarely be a total lack of evidence
to support the censor's determination.
From its pronouncement, the Mutual Film rule, and the numerous
federal and state decisions which followed it virtually without dissent,
drew sharp criticism from law reviews, 80 text-writers,81 and motion
picture producers, 2 as well as from film distributors seeking relief
from the onerous restrictions of censorship. Extensive advances had
been made in movie production, both in the general artistic quality of
film dramas and in the technical processes of production. More im-
portant had been the increasingly frequent film treatment of ideational
themes-of political, social, economic and religious issues-which made
all the more objectionable the virtually absolute power of the censor
to determine what pictures a large portion of the population might
see. Yet the motion picture industry continued to be restrained by a
harness devised for the silent, one-reel, flickering product of nickelo-
deon days.88
Graves, 253 App. Div. 475, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 573 (3d Dep't 1938), aff'd, 278 N. Y.
498, 15 N. E. 435 (1938); Hallmark Productions, Inc. v. Department of Educa-
tion, 153 Ohio St. 595, 93 N. E. 2d 13 (1950) ; State v. Clifton, 11 Ohio St. 91,
160 N. E. 625 (1928) (where censor refused to examine film of Dempsey-Tunney
fight and denied license for its exhibition, the court reversed his determination as
being unreasonable and arbitrary); In, re Franklin Film Mfg. Corp., 253 Pa.
422, 98 Atl. 623 (1916). Contra: Equitable Motion Picture Corp., 25 Pa. Dist.
114 (1916) ("This right of appeal ... is not limited to an inquiry'into the good
.faith of the board or to the question of an abuse of the discretion primarily vested
i'n them, but assigns to the court the duty of determining de novo whether or not
the reel in question . . . " is such as may be licensed. 25 Pa. Dist. at 115.
0 Kadin, Administrative Censorship: A Study of the Mails, Motion Pictures
and Radio, Broadcasting, 19 B. U. L. REv. 533, 552-554 (1939) ; Kupferman and
O'Brien, op. cit. supra note 4; Notes, 39 COL. L. REV. 1383 (1939), 60 YALE L. J.
696, 719 (1951) ; Comment, 49 YALE L. J. 87, 110-113 (1939) ; 15 COL. L. REv.
.546 (1915).
'
1 INGLIS, FREEDOM OF THE MOVIES p. vi (1947); EarST, TE FIRST FRuE-
DoM 182 (1946); CHAFEE, FaEE SPEECH IN THE UNxTri STATES 540-548 (1941).
"2 Early in 1939, Walter Wanger declared the time opportune to demand
for the movies the freedom accorded the press. N. Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1939, § 9,
.p. 5, col. 2. More recently, Eric Johnston, head of the Motion Picture Associa-
tion, said, "We intend to meet the issue of political censorship head-on in the
highest court in the land. We're after a clear cut decision that will give the
screen the full protection and freedom guaranteed by our American Bill of
Rights." 36 CORNELL L. Q. 273, 278 (1951).
"3 The objections' to film censorship are many. Rarely are its effects wholly
confined to the jurisdictions having operative censor boards., Producers must try
to anticipate the demands of the more important censor groups, with the result
that the whole American movie audience has its movie fare "censored" in the
process. The low salaries paid censors are not likely to attract persons "well
qualified by education and experience" for the job, nor is the political character
.of most of these positions any, assurance of the possession of such qualifications.
It is significant that after 1922, the nadir of movie morality, only two censor-
ship statutes were enacted, one of these being quickly repealed, and the other
being deliberately designed as a political control measure. Apparently the efforts
of the film industry at internal improvement, beginning seriously in 1922, were
material in reducing the need for such official control.
The granting of full freedom from censorship to radio and television brought
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An avenue of attack not available to the opponents of film censor-
ship at the time of the Mutual Film decisions was opened up by Gitlow
v. New York,3 4 where the United States Supreme Court first interpreted
the guaranties of personal liberty embodied in the First Amendment as
restrictions on state action. Yet, despite a Supreme Court dictum
noting the obsolescence of its 1915 attitude towards censorship, 35 both
state and federal courts resisted to the last all urgings that they ad-
minister to it the coup de grace.3 6
. Events leading up to the decision under consideration, Joseph Bur-
styn, Inc. v. Wilson,37 illustrate certain of the dangers inherent in movie
censorship, particularly the responsiveness of the system to pressures
exerted by well-organized groups. Imported into the United States
without objection from customs authorities,3 8 The Miracle,3 9 a short
Italian-made picture, was combined -with two other foreign-language
films into an English-subtitled trilogy, Ways of Love. Licensed with-
the illogical result that a given film, banned from the theaters of a state, might
at the same time be telecast from stations therein without hindrance. 48 STAT.
1091 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 326 (1947); Allen B. Dumont Laboratories, Inc. v.
Carrol, 86 F. Supp. 813 (E. D. Pa. 1949), aff'd, 184 F. 2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U. S. 929 (1951).
'268 U. S. 652 (1925). The court said in that case: "For present purposes
we may and do assume that . . . freedom of speech and of the press . . .are
among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States." 268 U. S.
at 666. This protection has been specifically extended to newspapers, Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931), and Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S.
233 (1936); street distribution of leaflets, Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147
(1939); picketing, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940) ; public playing of
phonograph records, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); house-to-
house distribution of religious publications, Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S.
141 (1943); distribution of crime magazines, Winters v. New York, 333 U. S.
507 (1948); and the use of sound amplifiers, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77
(1949).
"5 "We have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are
included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment."
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U S. 131, 166 (1948).
" E. g., RD-DR Corp. v. Smith, 89 F. Supp. 596 (N. D. Ga. 1950), aff'd, 183
F. 2d 562 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 853 (1950) ; Gelling v. Texas,
247 S. W. 2d 95 (Tex. Cr. App. 1952), reversed, 343 U. S. 960 (1952).
' 343 U. S. 495, 72 Sup. Ct. 777 (1952).
' To import "any obscene, lewd, lascivious or filthy ... motion picture film"
wast at that time a criminal offense under 35 STAT. 1138 (1909), 18 U. S. C.
§ 396 (1947). The importation of any obscene "print" or "picture" was also
barred. 46 STAT. 688 (1930), 19 U. S. C. § 1305 (1947).
" Produced in Italy under the direction of Roberto Rossellini in 1948, The
Miracle is the story of a demented Italian peasant girl who is made drunk, se-
duced, and then immediately abandoned by a stranger whom she believes to be
St. Joseph. Her resulting pregnancy she declares to be of divine origin; in
answer to this proclamation, her companions taunt and mock her cruelly. The
narration makes clear the association, in the mind of the girl, of her own ex-
perience with the Virgin Birth. The film ends with the birth of her child in a
deserted hillside chapel. Crowther, The Strange Case of "The Miracle," Atlan-
tic Monthly, April 1951, p. 35, 36-37.
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out difficulty,40 the trilogy opened at the Paris Theatre in New York
City on December 12, 1950.41 Immediately attacked by the National
Legion of Decency as "a sacrilegious and blasphemous mockery of
Christian religious truth,"' 4 The Miracle was officially condemned by
Cardinal Spellman, 43 and the Paris Theatre picketed by members of
the Catholic War Veterans organization and other Catholic lay groups.
44
In response to extensive protests against the showing of The Miracle
(though it was strongly defended both by Protestant clergymen and
by some Catholics), the Board of Regents, having viewed the film
and found it to be "sacrilegious" and therefore barred under the terms
of the statute,45 ordered its exhibition permits revoked.4  The dis-
tributor of the film took the Regent's determination into the New York
courts for review. Both the Appellate Division47 and the Court of
'
0 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 72 Sup. Ct. 777, 785 (1952). The censor
'could have refused to issue an exhibition permit had he found the film "sacri-
legious." N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 122.
"'Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 72 Sup. Ct. 777, 785 (1952).
N. Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1950, p. 23, col. 4.
N. Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1951, p. 1, col. 2.
"Crowther, supra note 39, at 38. "The most logical assumption, on the face
of the evidence, is that The Miracle became an issue after it opened in New York,
and that the Catholic artillery was assembled in mounting arrays as it was seen
that the distributor and the theatre were far from minded to heed the special
objections of the Church." Id. at 36.
Italian Catholic critics disagreed as to whether The Miracle was sacrilegious.
Although possessed of the power to ban the movie from Italy, the Vatican did
not do so, and it was widely distributed there. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
72 Sup. Ct. 777, 784-785 (1952). American Catholic opinion was by no means
united. Allen Tate, well-known Catholic poet and critic, observed, "in the long
run what Cardinal Spellman will have succeeded in doing is insulting the intelli-
gence and faith of American Catholics with the assumption that a second-rate
motion picture could in any way undermine their morals or shake their faith."
N. Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1951, p. 24, col. 7.
As a part of the effort to halt its showing. The Miracle was declared by the
New York City Commissioner of Licenses to be "blasphemous," and a revocation of
the exhibiting theater's license was threatened, should the film not be withdrawn.
A New York court quickly found the Commissioner to have exceeded his authority
in this instance. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. McCaffrey, 198 Misc. 884, 101 N. Y. S.
2d 892 (Sup. Ct. 1952). New York, following the majority rule, holds that
state censorship precludes censorship by local authorities, See Note, 126 A. L. R.
1363 (1940).
"
5 N. Y. EDUC. LAW § 122.
N. Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1951, p. 9, col. 2. A committee of the Board of Re-
gents had previously viewed the film and, despite protests of the licensee that
it was without authority to do so, had recommended revocation of the license.
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 72 Sup. Ct. 777, 779 (1952). The statute author-
izes revocation only by the Director or other person authorized to issue such
permits. N. Y. EDtc. LAW § 125.
'
7 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 278 App. Div. 253, 104 N. Y. S. 2d 740
(3d Dep't 1951). Appellant contended that the New York statute under which
The Miracle was banned was invalid on three counts: (1) it was a previous
restraint on freedom of speech and of the press, prohibited both by the New York
Constitution, art. I, § 8, and by the United States Constitution, Amendments I
and 14; (2) the term "sacrilegious" was so vague as to violate the demands of
due process of law; and (3) the statute constituted an infringement on the guaran-
ty of separation of Church and State.
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Appeals,48 relying primarily on the Mutual Film precedent, sustained
the license revocation as against all contentions of appellant.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in tleciding the case on
appeal49 from the courts of New York, limited itself to consideration
of the issue of whether the alleged abridgement of the freedoms of
speech and of the press was violative of the federal constitution. Mr.
Justice Clark, speaking for the court, dispatched with incisive brevity
each of the main elements of the Mutual Film rationale. That the
movies may be designed to entertain as well as to inform was found
to be no contradiction of their status as a significant medium for the
communication of ideas. The profit motive of the motion picture indus-
try was -declared to have no relevance to the movies' claim to consti-
tutional protection; as the court observed, the business character of
book and newspaper publishing has never been accounted material in
determining the scope of their freedom. The allegedly superior capacity
for evil possessed by the films was found to be of possible relevance in
determining the scope of community control which should be permitted,
but it was n6t viewed as authorization for "substantially unbridled
censorship such as we have here."5 ° Having thus rejected the chief
arguments in support of the Mutual rule, the court for the first time
declared that motion pictures lie within the protective embrace of the
freedom of expression guaranties of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.'
Yet, Mr. Justice Clark continued, "It does not follow that the Con-
stitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of
every kind at all times and all places."15 2 Nor are the movies necessarily
subject to precisely the same rules as govern other modes of expres-
sion. But the First Amendment makes freedom of expression the rule,
and the burden is now upon the censoring jurisdiction to justify any
restraint which it imposes. 3
Turning to the specific wording of the New York statute under
which The Miracle was banned, the court discovered in the statutory
Briefs as amici curiae were filed by the New York Civil Liberties Committee
and the National Council on Freedom from Censorship on behalf of appellant,
and by the New York State Catholic Welfare Committee on behalf of appellees.
s Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 303 N. Y. 242, 101 N. E. 2d 665 (1951).
Two judges favored reversal of the Regents. order.
," Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 72 Sup. Ct. 777 (1952). See Extracts from
Briefs to the United States Supreme Court in. Burstyn v. Wilson, et al., 12 LAw.
GUILD Rxv., 82 (1952).
" Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 72 Sup. Ct. 777, 781 (1952).1Id. at 783.
L2Id. at 781. The Supreme Court has frequently held that freedom of ex-
pression is not absolute. E. g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S. 315 (1951) ; Ko-
vacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S.
568 (1942); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931).
"' Joseph Burstyn. Inc. v. Wilson, 72 Sup. Ct. 777, 781 (1952).
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condemnation of "sacrilegious" movies no narrow, explicit, and justi-
fiable exception to the rule of freedom just enunciated. The term "sac-
rilegious" was found to be so vague that "the censor is set adrift upon
a boundless sea amid a myriad of conflicting currents of religious views,
with no charts but those provided by the most vocal and powerful ortho-
doxies."54  But vagueness was not the only defect in the New York
law. Said the court, "The state has no legitimate interest in protect-
ing any or all religions from views distasteful to them which is suf-
ficient to justify prior restraints upon the expression of those views."5'
Thus the court actually limited itself in terms to the holding that "a
state may not ban a film on the basis of a censor's conclusion that it
is 'sacrilegious.' "56
Where then -does the law stand today, in the light of the Miracle
decision, with regard to the official censorship of motion pictures? Ob-
viously those statutes and ordinances which authorize the banning of
films found by a censor to be "sacrilegious" 57 are to that extent invalid.
Furthermore, much of the present legislation is highly vulnerable, in
whole or in part, in that it is so vague as to provide the censor with
no intelligible working criteria.58 The Supreme Court has indicated
" Id. at 782.
"Ibid. The New York Court of Appeals had said, "There is nothing mys-
terious about the standard [sacrilegious] to be applied. It is simply this: that
no religion, as that word is understood by the ordinary, reasonable person, shall
be treated with contempt, mockery, scorn and ridicule to the extent that it has
been here, by those engaged in selling entertainment by way of motion pictures."
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 303 N. Y. 242, 101 N. E. 2d 665, 672 (1951).
"Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 72 Sup. Ct. 777, 783 (1952). As Mr. Jus-
tice Reed pointed out in a concurring opinion, this narrow holding means that
the court must measure the facts of each license denial against the principles of
the First Amendment to determine its permissibility. Ibid.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter dwelled lengthily on the
etymology of the word "sacrilegious," which appears never to have received
judicial definition prior to the instant case. Consequently neither court nor censor
could know what was condemnable under that term. To offer to all 300 re-
ligious sects of the United States protection from any offense, as proposed by
the New York courts, would have the effect, he pointed out, of extending such
protection only to those groups capable of raising a politically substantial outcry,
as in the present case. Id. at 783.l MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 66A, § 6 (1939); N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 122;
PA. STAr. AxiN. tit. 4, § 43 (Purdon, 1930).
" E. g., the Ohio law allows the showing of "only such films as are . . .of
a moral, educational or amusing and harmless character. . . . " OHio GEr. CODE
ANN. § 154-47b (Page, 1946). The Louisiana statute employs exactly the same
standards. LA. STAT. ANN. § 4:304 (West, 1951).
Since the Miracle decision, the United States Supreme Court has reversed
the conviction in a state court of an appellant who exhibited Pinky after it was
banned under a Marshall, Texas, ordinance which authorized the local censor
board to deny an exhibition permit to any film which, in its opinion, was "of
such character as to be prejudicial to the best interests of the people of said
City." Gelling v. Texas, 343 U. S. 960, 72 Sup. Ct. 1002 (1952) (memorandum
decision), reversing 247 S. W. 2d 95 (Tex. Cr. App. 1952). Frankfurter, J.,
concurring, noted that the ordinance offended the due process of law clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment on the score of "indefiniteness." 72 Sup. Ct. 1002.
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that it might approve statutes including as standards "words well under-
stood through long use in the criminal law-obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, indecent, or disgusting. '59  Such general phrases as "tend to
debase or corrupt morals," 60 or "tend to corrupt morals or incite to
crime,"' 11 would probably be found to lack sufficient definiteness, unless
strictly construed by censor or court. The familiar practice of justi-
fying a denial of license with the mere quotation of a statutory phrase,
thus avoiding the necessity for findings and supporting reasoning,62
will doubtless be more closely restrained.
The misuse of censorship standards permissible in themselves, or
the attempted use of standards not set forth in the statute relied upon,
would almost certainly be struck down by the courts. 63 Movies dealing
with political and social issues have proved especially susceptible to the
,censor's ban on quite diverse, not to say devious, grounds.64 It is
"Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 518 (1948)..
"KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-103 (1949) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 43 (Pur-
don, 1930). In Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of New
York, 280 App. Div. 260, 114 N. Y. S. 2d 561 (3d Dep't 1952), a court split 3-2
upheld a denial of license for exhibiting La Ronde which, it had been found, was
"immoral" and "would tend to corrupt morals." Two dissenting judges contended
that the whole New York statute is unconstitutional, under the Miracle decision.
In these cases, they argued, "the rule should be . . . [that] the determination of
any board or bureau should only be upheld where it is clear that any conclusion
to the contrary would not be entertained by any reasonable mind." Id. at 566.
"VA. CODE ANN. § 2-105 (1950) ; MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 66A, § 6
(1946).
"Kadin, supra note 30, at 555.
*'E. g., Schuman v. Pickert, 277 Mich. 225, 269 N. W. 152 (1936) (Detroit
'ordinance allowed censoring only of movies found "immoral or indecent"; censor
was reversed when he banned film, in reliance on this ordinance, solely because
he considered it "pure Soviet propaganda").
"Gelling v. Texas, 343 U. S. 960 (1952); RD-DR Corp. v. Smith, 89 F.
Supp. 596 (N. D. Ga. 1950), aff'd, 183 F. 2d 562 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U. S. 853 (1950) (Lost BomudarieJ banned from Atlanta solely because censor
believed that it might "adversely affect the peace, health, morals and good order
of the City" by encouraging racial strife) ; United Artists Corp. v. Board of
Censors, 189 Tenn. 397, 225 S. W. 2d 550 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 952(1950) (Curley banned under Memphis ordinance barring films "inimical to the
public safety, health, -morals, or welfare" because it showed white and Negro
children attending the same school); U. S. v. Motion Picture Film The Spirit
of '76, 252 Fed. 946 (S. D. Cal. 1917) (film consisting of incidents from American
Revolution, including scenes showing extreme cruelties committed by British
troops, suppressed on grounds that it would tend to weaken wartime support for
an ally) ; Hygenic Productions, Inc. v. Keenan, 1 N. J. Super. 461, 62 A. 2d 150
(Ch. 1948) (Mon amid Dad, dealing with parental delinquency and venereal dis-
ease, banned for commercial showing, though not considered by censor to be
obscene or indecent); American Committee on Maternal Welfare, Inc. v. Man-
gan, 257 App. Div. 570, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 39 (3d Dep't 1939), aff'd, 283 N. Y. 551, 27
N. E. 2d -278 (1940) (Birth of a Baby banned from places of amusement as "in-
decent" and "immoral," though non-commercial showing allowed); Foy Pro-
ductions, Ltd. v. Graves, 253 App. Div. 475, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 573 (3d Dep't 1938),
aff'd, 278 N. Y. 498, 15 N. E. 2d 435 (1938) (Tomorrow's Children, dealing with
sterilization, banned by New York censor as immoral); Hallmark Productions,
Inc. v. Department of Education, 153 Ohio St. 595, 93 N. E. 2d 13 (1950) (The
Devil's Weed rejected as "harmful");' American Committee to Aid Spanish
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possible, however, that the future banning of films, either before or
after exhibition, on purely political grounds might be required to satis-
fy the "clear and present danger" test.65
There may be a demand that each film be viewed, not as a mere
succession of scenes, but as a whole work, and evaluated according to
its "dominant effect."" Such is the rule applied by customs officials
to books.61 Yet the very nature of a motion picture film, from which,
unlike a book, a scene or a line may readily be deleted to meet local
demands, may argue against this innovation.
The motion picture industry may see fit to send other test cases
through the courts with the object of reducing censorship legislation
to a nullity by a patient process of judicial pruning. Jurisdictions de-
siring to continue film censorship may be expected to offset such a
move by legislative amendments making more definite the grounds
for censorship available to their censors. 68
There is the possibility that the whole system of official censorship
will pass to its deserved place in limbo, either by outright repeal or by
judicial construction. Yet even if all censorship legislation were struck
down, there would remain the very substantial restraints placed on
motion picture producers by their own extensive system of self-censor-
ship and taboos ;69 the numerous private, non-industry reviewing agen-
Democracy v. Bowsher, 132 Ohio St. 599, 9 N. E. 2d 617 (1937) (Spain in Flames,
a documentary on the Spanish Civil War, banned by censor board on grounds
that "it was harmful in stirring up race hatred and that it was antireligious").
"Note, 60 YALE L. J. 696, 712 (1951). Such a showing would of course
be unnecessary where the words or representations were obscene or libellous in
nature. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250 (1952).
" This suggestion has been made to the courts, only to be rejected. Eureka
Productions, Inc. v. Byrne, 252 App. Div. 355, 300 N. Y. Supp. 218 (3d Dep't
1937).
"'Each word of. the book contributes like a bit of mosaic to the detail of the
the picture which Joyce [the author] is seeking to construct for his readers."
United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S. D. N. Y. 1933),
aff'd, 72 F. 2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
" There remain, in any event, the criminal obscenity statutes, which have
always been the chief reliance of most jurisdictions. E. g., N. C. GFN. STAT.
§ 14-193 (1943). There are also available to municipal authorities zoning, fire,
sanitary, and building laws and ordinances which have been employed to effect
an indirect censorship of movie content through the simple expedient of threaten-
ing revocation of theater licenses, should a disfavored film be shown. Silverman
v. Gilchrist, 260 Fed. 564 (2d Cir. 1919) ; Bainbridge v. Minneapolis, 131 Miin.
195, 154 N. W. 964 (1915).
" The Motion Picture Association of America (prior to 1945 the Motion
Picture Producers and Distributors of America), was established by the industry
in 1922. The avowed purpose of the organization, popularly known as the
"Hays Office," was to clean up the movies from the inside, a job in which it
has achieved varying degrees of success. The actual work of the M. P. A. is
carried on chiefly by two subsidiary agencies. The Production Code Adminis-
tration supervises production by member companies from script to finished film.
All advertising material is similarly handled by the Advertising Code Adminis-
tration. At times criticized as stultifying factors in film production, the M. P. P.
D. A. and M. P. A. appear to have been largely successful in blocking the further
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cies ;'0 and the economic pressures arising from the necessity of main-
taining a large and steady "box-office," which means never seriously
offending any significant group or point of view.7 '
Although it is but a first step, the Miracle decision promises to do
much to bring the law of film censorship into phase with the ideal of
substantially complete freedom of expression from all prior restraints,
which has increasingly characterized the law of the United States.
JOHN L. SANDERS.
Costs-Attorney Fees as Costs in Taxpayers' Actions
The recent case of Homer v. Chamber of Commerce' involved a
taxpayer's action to recover, for the benefit of a municipality, public
moneys which had been unlawfully disbursed.2 The court held that
"where, on refusal of municipal authorities to act, a taxpayer success-
fully prosecutes an action to recover, and does actually recover and
collect, funds of the municipality which had been expended wrong-
fully or misapplied, the court has implied power in the exercise" of a
sound discretion to make a reasonable allowance from the funds actually
extension of official censorship. INGLIS, FREEDOM OF THE MovIEs 87-96 et seq.(1947). The M. P. A. embraces 95% of the producers, distributors, and exhib-
itors of the nation. Few theaters will rent films lacking the M. P. A. seal of
approval, which is borne by 95% of all films released in the United States. Hughes
Tool Co. v. Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 1006
(S. D. N. Y. 1946).
"0 The National Board of Review, pioneer in the field of non-industry film
reviewing, was formed in 1909 with the encouragement of certain producers fear-
ful of threatened government control. Working independently of the film in-
dustry, and with non-professional viewers, the Board operates in the public in-
terest under the slogan, "Selection Not Censorship." It does not censor films, but
views and approves those films which in the opinion of the viewers are neither
violative of the obscenity statutes, detrimental to public morality, nor subversive
in effect upon the national audience, when evaluated as a whole. Its operations
are financed by fees charged producers for reviewing films submitted by them.
INGLIS, FREEDom OF THE MoviEs 74-82 (1947) ; 49 YALE L. J. 87, 108-109 (1939).
The National Legion of Decency was formed in 1933 at the instance of the
Catholic Bishops of the United States, and soon secured for itself a position of
great power. Acting as a reviewing agency, the Legion classifies films for the
information of all Catholics, a great many of whom take a periodic pledge to
respect the group's recommendations. In its "C" or "condemned for Catholics"
rating, the Legion holds a weapon the potency of which is much feared by pro-
ducers. INGLIS, op. cit. supra at 120-125 (1947). See Kazan, Pressure Prob-
lem[;] Director Discusses Cuts Compelled in "A Streetcar Named Desire," in
EMERSON AND HABER, EDs., POLITICAL AND CIVrI RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
722 (1952). There are also several other private organizations which review
films in the interest of their members and the public. See 60 YALE L. J. 696, 714
n. 40 (1951).
"
1 ERNST, THE FIRST FREEDOm 202-203 (1946).
1236 N. C. 96, 72 S. E. 2d 21 (1952).
'See Horner v. Chamber of Commerce, 235 N. C. 77, 68 S. E. 2d 660 (1952);
Homer v. Chamber of Commerce, 231 N. C. 440, 57 S. E. 2d 789 (1950) (The
case was before the Supreme Court twice on appeal. The background facts
may be found in these decisions.)
19521
